A Condition Against Torah Law

Nazir (2:4) | Yisrael Bankier | 19 days ago

The Mishnah (2:4) teaches that if someone attempts to become a nazir on condition that they may drink wine or become tameh met, then the condition is disregarded; they are a nazir with all the prohibitions of nazir. The Gemara explains that the reason is that the person made a condition that contradicts the Torah law. In such a case the condition is ignored. We shall try to understand this law.

The Tosfot (Ketubot 56a) discusses the case in the Gemara where a man is mekadesh a woman on condition that he will not provide her with the things that a husband is obligated to provide his is wife by Torah law. Much like our case, R' Meir maintains that the kiddushin works and all obligations still apply. The Gemara explains that R' Meir disregards the stipulation since it goes against the Torah law.

The Tosfot comments that for a condition to work, R' Meir maintains that it must resemble the tenai bnei Gad u'bnei Reuven. In other words, R' Meir looks at the agreement made between Moshe and the tribes of Gad and Reuven that enabled them to receive their portion in the Transjordan, as a model for all stipulations. In other words, for a stipulation to be effective it must include what happens if the condition is fulfilled and what will happen if it is not fulfilled. This is known as a tenai kaful. The Tosfot explains that the case in kiddushin must be a tenai kaful, since a different reason is brought why the tenai falls away. That being the case, the Tosfot ask why the kiddushin should work at all. The man stipulated that he only wanted the kiddushin to work if he is relieved of those obligations.

The Tosfot cites the Ri who explains that were it not for the tenai bnei Gad u'bnei Reuven, one might understand that after an action that has a legal affect has taken place, a condition does not have the ability to undo its effect, even if it is not fulfilled. Once the tenai bnei Gad u'bnei Reuven was taught, we learn that a stipulation can counter the effect of a physical action. A condition that goes against a Torah law however does not fit the model of tenai bnei Gad u'bnei Reuven. Consequently, such conditions do not have the power to neutralise the affect of an action. The kiddushin is therefore intact despite the stipulation. Similarly in our case, the person is a nazir with all the obligations of a nazir.

The Tosfot however raise another question. We learn in Menachot (13:10) that if someone accepted to become a nazir on condition that he can shave and bring his korbanot at the end of the term in beit chonyo, if he does so then he has satisfied his neder. We learnt in Menachot (see volume 5 issue 14) that beit chonyo was different centre of worship that was setup in Alexandria under unfortunate circumstances. Whilst it is debated whether it was built with noble intent or for idol worship, it is clear that a nazir is not meant to bring his korbanot there. The Gemara explains that the person's intent was simply to cause himself discomfort that resembled a nazir. Beit Chonyo was closer for him, and it was only under those circumstances that he was willing to make the neder. It would appear then that this is another case where there is a stipulation that goes against the Torah. One would expect in this case that the condition to bring the korbanot at Beit Chonya falls away. The person would then become a regular nazir and be obligated to bring the korbanot to the Beit HaMikdash.

The Tosfot cite the Ri who explains that the issue of making a condition against the Torah is only when that is his intention -- to go against a Torah law. In the case in Menachot the person simply assumed that it was a mitzvah to complete the nezirut in Beit Chonyo as it would be in the Beit HaMikdash. Since the intent was not to break a Torah law, then it can indeed be learnt from the tenai bnei Gad u'bnei Reuven.

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